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REPRESENTING THE CHILD IN CHILD PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS: TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM
Prof. Merril Sobie*
The American Child Protective System, incorporating the
then embryotic causes of action we now call child neglect,
dependency and termination of parental rights, was first established
in the late nineteenth century.1 The underlying premise was the
common law parens patriae doctrine, a judicial mechanism
whereby the state assumes the role of a parent who has erred by
maltreating or abandoning her child. 2 Given the seemingly
benevolent doctrine, early child protective proponents perceived no
need for legal representation.3 Adjudication was swift, pursued
solely for the benefit of maltreated children. Accordingly, for
almost one century thereafter, children and their parents were not
afforded mandated legal representation.4
By the mid-twentieth century, the system's informality and
lack of procedural due process began to be challenged.5 In 1962,
New York mandated the appointment of a "law guardian" in every
child protective case. The statute defined a "law guardian" as an
attorney who represented a child.7 One generation later, most states
* Professor of Law, Haub School of Law, Pace University. Professor Sobie
has published several books and articles concerning juvenile justice and child
welfare.
1 See, e.g., N.Y. Law 1877, C. 428.
2 "Parens Patria" ... refers traditionally to role of State as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles ..." Black Law
Dictionary, 6 th Edition. One of the earliest applications was Ex Parte Crouse, 4
Wharton 9 (Pa. 1839).
' Naomi Cahn, State Representation of Children's Interests, 40 Fam. L.Q. 109
(2006).
4id.
' See, e.g., Gellhorn, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK
CITY, Dodd Mead, 1954; also Gellhorn Hyman & Asch, CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES IF THE COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, 103 U.P. LR 444 (1954)
6 Family Court Act, ch. 686, 1962 N.Y. Laws (codified as N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §
241).
7 Id.
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had enacted statutes providing for some form of representation,
although not necessarily legal representation. 8
Today, most children who have become enmeshed in
dependency or other protective cases are represented by an
attorney. 9 In a few states, courts have held that the child is
constitutionally entitled to counsel, a principle which cements the
right and mandates, as a constitutional right, "effective
representation."10
Although the child's right to legal representation has
expanded exponentially, the role of counsel remains controversial.
Just what is the hapless child's attorney supposed to do? Is he to
assume a traditional client-based advocacy approach? Is he to be
guided by her perception of the child's "best interests"? To what
extent is the age of the represented youngster relevant? Should
representation be based upon one underlying principle, or
alternatively, a complex set of criteria?
Dozens of articles, bar association standards, and law school
symposia have addressed this important issue. However, a
consensus appears to be as elusive as ever. In fact, the further we
have proceeded down the representation road, the more complexity
and diversity has entered the system. As a nation, we are tied up in
knots, unable to construct a viable consensus model. As noted in
one recent publication:
8 The Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (P.L.No 93-247),
enacted in 1974, requires that a child be "represented," without specifying legal
representation, the measure encouraged but did not require representation by an
attorney.
9 The exact number or percentage is impossible to calculate; a clear majority of
states have enacted laws which require representation, but in several other states,
representation is either totally discretionary, dependent upon the child's age, or
is triggered by a specific request.
10 See Kenny v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005); In re S. W, 856
P. 2d. 286 (Okla 1993); see also In re Dependency of MSR, 174 Wash. 2d 1, 271
P. 3d 234 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 2012) (where the court held in a rather confusing
opinion that the right to appointed counsel is not "universal."). To this author, it
is surprising that the constitutional right to counsel has been pursued in only a
few states.
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law defining child representation is quite unsettled.
The variations across jurisdictions may decrease the
quality of representation and create confusion ... A
2005 survey indicated that there are at least fifty-six
variations in child representation models among the
fifty states."
Astoundingly, the number of representation models exceeds
the number of states. 12 That may constitute a unique phenomenon
in American jurisprudence, but surely cannot be viewed as a
beneficial or even a workable guide to the bar or the bench. There
must be a better approach.
This article will attempt a new approach, one based on an
analysis of the child's interests in a child protective proceeding. As
will be discussed in Part 1, most interests are surprisingly
overlooked or barely articulated in the representation debate. Part 2
will summarize the statutes and case law governing the role of the
child's counsel in the child protective litigation continuum. The
frequently lengthy process may range from initiation by a child
protective agency to the achievement of family reunification or
other permanency goal. For children, the continuum of sequential
proceeding may span years or decades. Finally, Part 3 will outline a
possible solution to the present complex, inconsistent, and
frequently incoherent paradigm, one grounded upon traditional
representation, as applied to the multiple child interests at stake in
every child protective case.
PART 1: THE CHILD'S LEGAL INTERESTS
Child protective proceedings deeply affect multiple aspects
of family life. The impact is extremely profound when a child or
children are removed from their home, temporarily or
11 Donald N. Duquette, Child Representation in America: Progress Report from
the National Quality Improvement Center, 46 FAM. L.J.87, at 116-117 (2012)
12 [ ]
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permanently. 13 When removal is not requested or court ordered, the
repercussions may be less profound, but nevertheless substantial.
Further, child protective administrative and judicial procedures are
inherently intimidating and frightening to young persons. Children
need a guiding legal hand to protect their multiple interests
embedded in the legal and social service labyrinth, and are entitled
to assurances that their desires will be addressed and their autonomy
respected.
The myriad and occasionally conflicting interests are listed
below. Not every legal interest is relevant to each case. For
example, parental visitation becomes relevant only when the child
has been removed or custody has been transferred to a non-parent or
a social services agency. Nevertheless, most of the following legal
rights and interests are present in every child protective case:
1. The right to safety and protection.
2. The child's right to autonomy and privacy.
3. The right to be consulted and advised of the
legal proceedings and their ramifications.
4. Inclusion in the legal process through
consultation, participation, and consent.
5. Mandated governmental services to help the
child.
6. Services available or mandated for the parent
and the family.
7. The right to request or to seek the
modification or termination of temporary or
permanent court orders.
8. Educational rights which may be ordered or
modified by the court.
9. Knowledge of the elements of dependency,
permanency hearing, or termination of
parental rights proceedings.
10. When relevant, immigration issues.
11. When placed, parental-child visitation.
13 See Lawrence M. Berger et. al., Estimating the "Impact" of Out-of-Home
Placement on Child Well-Being: Approaching the Problem of Selection Bias, 60
CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1856 (2009)
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12. Possible kinship placement or other extended
family involvement, such as supervision by a
relative.
13. When placed, the specific placement home
and geographic location.
14. Relationships with siblings, including
possible joint placement or sibling visitation.
15. When placed, knowledge and input in
determining the permanency goal.
Several legal interests are generic, implicit in every type of
litigation, civil or criminal. For that matter, most are applicable to
non-litigation attorney-client endeavors. When a lawyer is
negotiating an employment contract, the client obviously has the
right to be consulted and participate in the negotiations and
discussions. 14 A tort attorney knows that one of his responsibilities
is to protect the autonomy and privacy of his client.15 Every attorney
determines the goal or goals he should attempt to achieve,
establishing those goals through advice, consultation, legal research,
and discussions with the client. 16 Lawyers generally know that they
can determine strategy and the tactical aspects of litigation or
negotiations, but that a substantive resolution of the dispute requires
client consent. 17 We hardly need remind attorneys of the legal
issues, which they confront in a specific case, or the allocation of
attorney and client rights and responsibilities.
More accurately, we hardly need remind attorneys, except
lawyers assigned to represent children. Of course, many children's
attorneys acknowledge and ensure that their client's generic legal
interests are advocated and protected. For example, in one case the
attorney for the child argued successfully that a statutory mandated
invasive, albeit unnecessary, medical examination would violate
her constitutional right to privacy. 8 Nevertheless, at best the
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009).
15 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
16 Attorney-client discussions may become difficult or acrimonious, but that
does not preclude client involvement.
17 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009).
18 Matter of Shernise C. (Rhonda R.), 91 A.D.3d 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
2019]
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adherence to the customary attorney-client responsibilities are
inconsistent.
To be sure, several of the above enumerated legal interests
are unique to child protective cases. For example, children are not
in danger of being removed from their homes and placed in an alien
foster home in any other proceeding. However, the same could be
said if one enumerated the legal issues, generic and specific, in a tort
or a contracts case. Every lawyer determines the generic and
specific relevant issues when representing a client; for experienced
counsel the determination is virtually automatic.
A few child protective legal issues, such as the right to safety
and protection, are well known. Children's attorneys almost always
address those issues, while simultaneously failing to address other
essential issues, such as consultation with the client, client
participation in the proceedings, educational and welfare rights, or
the protection of client autonomy. 19 As noted in one recent article
discussing the "best interests" legal doctrine:
The traditional best interests standard therefore does
not address children's interests as persons or their
own right ... To the extent it does have substance, the
standard's conception of "best interests" tends to be
defined in relation to children's developmental needs
and parental rights. Children's interests beyond
dependency and autonomy remain largely
unarticulated and unexamined. 2
0
Just why are many of the child's legal interests
unacknowledged or overlooked? One possible factor is the child's
age, which may range from infancy to majority or, in some cases,
post majority.21 One cannot consult with an infant, and a very young
child's possible participation is indeed limited. However, most
children are of sufficient age to at least become partially engaged,
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and many adolescents can be fully engaged. Treating a two-year-
old one way does not excuse similar treatment to a twelve-year-old.
A greater factor may be the seemingly unending debate and
conflicts concerning whether the attorney for the child should
espouse her conclusions regarding the child's "best interest", or
alternatively advocate the child's wishes. The controversy will be
delineated in Part 2 of this article. Suffice to say at this point that
the child's wishes versus her best interests issue has dominated the
cases and literature, to the virtual exclusion of the child's attorney's
essential role in protecting and advocating most of the numerous
specific legal rights of his client.
Underscoring the limited "only placement or non-placement
matters" approach, the case law and scholarly emphasis has focused
on the attorney's position regarding the removal of the child client
from the parental home. Should the youngster remain at home,
perhaps with appropriate supervision and services, or should she be
placed in foster care or in the custody of a relative or other suitable
person? That is indeed the pivotal issue in a significant number of
cases. However, most children involved in dependency or child
neglect proceedings are not placed outside of their home or family
milieu. In those proceedings the pivotal issues may include parental
supervision, possible protective orders, family services, parental
rehabilitation, and participation by the child. Placement is a non-
issue.
Further, the child's legal interests in autonomy, extended
family relationships, consultation, and participation are present in
every case. Those interests need legal advocacy, bolstered by
relevant evidence, regardless of whether the state is seeking
placement. Those interests are, for the most part, not dependent on
whether the attorney is guided by a "best interest" or a "child's
wishes" perspective.
The only forums in which multiple legal interest have been
addressed are national and state bar association standards for
representing children. The 1999 American Bar Association
Standards of Practice for Lawyers who Represent Children in Abuse
2019]
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and Neglect Cases articulates a full range.22 Similarly, several state
bar association standards encompass the full range of legal
interests.23 Although important, the standards have in practice been
applied only intermittently. Of greater significance, the case law,
which focuses on the "best interests" or "child's wishes" role of the
attorney for the child, has rarely addressed compliance or held
counsel accountable for violating or overlooking the multiple
specific responsibilities delineated by organized bar standards.
PART 2: THE CASE LAW QUAGMIRE
The national history of confusion regarding the role of an
attorney for the child began with the federal 1974 Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).24 The Act required the
states to provide a guardian ad litem (GAL) for children involved in
child protective proceedings. 25 However, CAPTA did not prescribe
the qualifications or the legal responsibilities of the mandated
GAL.26 In 1996, Congress reauthorized CAPTA, permitting, inter-
alia, the appointment of an attorney as GAL; the attorney "would
make recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of
the child.",27 Congress suggested, if not mandated, that the child's
counsel would not forge a traditional attorney-client relationship
with her young client. 28 CAPTA was, again, reauthorized in 2010,
retaining the earlier language. 29 The state judiciaries, however,
22 ABA Standards for Lawyers who Represent Children in Abuse and Negligent
Cases (1999).
23 See, e.g. N.Y. State Bar Association, Committee on Children and the Law,
Standards for Attorneys Representing Children in NY Child Protective Foster
Care and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 2007, Standards A-2 and
B-1.
24 The Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, codified as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101 et seq.
25 Id.
26 id.
27 See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063 (1996).
28 See 42 USC. § 5106a (H (2). (A) (xiii)).
29 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L.
111-320).
[Vol. 28
TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM
remained free to chart their own course. Although several have
opted for a client directed model, with some exception, most adhere
to a guardian ad litem paradigm, or a complicated list of rules which
blend attorney and GAL responsibilities.3 °
Guardians ad Litem are not unique to child protective cases.
For example, when a child is injured in an automobile accident the
court will frequently appoint a GAL. The GAL then assumes the
role of the client in the ensuing negligence tort action, and in that
capacity directs the attorney who represents the young plaintiff.
Thus, the GAL authorizes discovery, becomes the de facto party in
motion practice, and, most notably, is required to agree to a
settlement or demand a trial.31 The role, developed over centuries,
is fundamentally clear, and the guardian ad litem is rarely an
attorney, although an attorney is not excluded from appointment.32
The role of a GAL, however, is far from clear when
appointed in a dependency or neglect proceeding. As noted in a
recent child custody case, where the GAL's role is similar to a child
protective case:
As commentators have noted a 'guardian ad
litem' has been variously defined as (1) the
person appointed by the court to serve as an
investigator to gather information about the
parents and the children and report back to
the court ... (2) the lawyer appointed to
represent the children; (3) an advocate for the
"best interests" of the children; (4) a
facilitator/mediator; and (5) some
combination of the above and more.33
30 See, e.g., Matter of Brian S. (Scott S.), 141 A.D. 3d 1145 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016).
31 See Nicholas v. Fahrenkamp, K FL. App. 15 th 160316 12018 W.L. 3357808
(FL App. Ct. 2018) (a tort case where the child initiated a malpractice action
against the GAL).
32 See NYCPLR §§ 1201-1202, West's General Laws of Rhode Island, § 9-1-
3.1.
"- Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 106 (Ky. 2014).
2019]
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The definitional contradictions, conflicts, and ambiguities
embedded in the brief quote are startling. The frustrations the court
experienced in attempting to rationalize the GAL's role are explicit.
The issue has been further confused by the appointment in
several states of an "attorney guardian ad litem." The inherent
ambiguities in the title are, for example, highlighted by a North
Carolina statute which requires that a GAL be appointed, but further
mandates that, if the GAL is not an attorney, a lawyer also be
assigned to represent the child. 34 Perhaps in the interests of
economy, the North Carolina courts tend to appoint an attorney to
serve as "attorney guardian ad litem." Combining multiple titles in
one appointment confuses the purpose and responsibilities of the
attorney assigned to represent the child. In fact, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, evading the issue, has held that "if the GAL is an
attorney, that person can perform the duties of both the GAL and the
attorney advocate. 35 The fact that the two distinct roles present a
potential if not actual conflict seemingly eluded the court.
Another practice in several states is to appoint a GAL in
every case, thereby complying with CAPTA, but subsequently
assign an attorney to represent the child when he expressly desires a
result with which the GAL disagrees. In other words, when the
GAL's "best interests" position conflicts with the child's position,
the child is entitled to legal representation. The rule seems fair but
has proven virtually impossible to implement. For example, the
question of when a conflict exists to trigger the assignment of an
attorney was litigated extensively in the Ohio case of In re [D.IV].
The applicable standard states:
Generally, the appointment of independent counsel
is warranted when a child has 'repeatedly expressed
a desire' to remain or be reunited with a parent but
the child's guardian ad litem believes it is in the
child's best interest that permanent custody of the
child be granted to the state.36
34 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-601.
35 In re J.H.K., 711 S.E. 2d 118 (N.C. 2011).
36 In re [D.N.], 2011 WL 4064491 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
[Vol. 28
TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM
In D.IV, the trial court's decision to decline assignment of an
attorney was upheld because the GAL had reported that the fifteen-
year-old had little attachment to either parent and had not
"repeatedly expressed a desire., 37 Note also that the court limited
the assignment of independent counsel to cases in which the conflict
involved only "permanent custody." 38 A "temporary" removal,
which may endure for months or years, was excluded.39
In another Ohio case, the GAL had reported that the children,
although old enough to state their wishes, had been ambivalent;
specifically, they had "gone back and forth" and been "all over the
map." 40 Their alleged ambivalence was sufficient to deny
appointment.4 1
In both cases the court relied solely on statements by the
GAL. In both cases, the court did not solicit the children's views
through an in-camera interview or independent evidence.42 Further,
there was no indication that the GAL had attempted to resolve the
children's' ambiguities through discussions with the youngsters, or
had attempted to resolve the GAL-client differences through other
mechanisms, such as the engagement of a social worker.43
Basing the decision solely on a GAL's representations is
questionable, regardless of the specific circumstances. After all, had
the GAL reported a conflict between her and the children, the
required assigned attorney would probably have taken a position
which contradicted the GAL. One is not usually motivated to request
the involvement of an adversary, particularly a legal adversary who,
unlike the GAL, may file motions, file briefs, call witnesses and
cross-examine witnesses, including the GAL. 44
" In re [D.N.], 2011 WL 4064491 (how repetitious the young person might be
before triggering appointment is not determined).
381d
39 i.
40 In re L.J., 2016 WL 1615542 (Ohio Ct. of Appeals 2016).
41 id.
42 See In re [D.N.], 2011 WL 4064491, In re L.J, 2016 WL 1615542.
43 id.
44 Adding to the dilemma, most courts have held that the GAL in child
protective cases, unlike other GALS, is entitled to immunity. See Farris v.
2019]
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Of greater significance, the Ohio courts, trial and appellate,
focused solely on the issue of placement versus reunification. 45 The
only fact relevant to the courts was whether the children wanted to
be placed or, alternatively remain at home.46 No other legal right of
the child was noted in the lengthy opinions.47 Yet, the specific
placement, such as possible kinship foster placement, the scope of
parental visitation, rehabilitation services, the children's
participation, and their autonomy rights, to mention only a few of
the myriad child legal interests, were absent in the appellate
opinions.48 The decision to appoint GAL versus an attorney, i.e.,
the American dilemma in child protective proceedings,
overshadowed any other consideration.
In Morgan v. Getter, a custody case, the Kentucky courts
grappled with a somewhat different dilemma. 49 The relevant statute
authorized the appointment of a GAL for the child and required the
GAL to be an attorney. 50 Given the inherent duality of a GAL and
counsel rolled into one individual, specifically child advocacy
versus "best interests," the court coined a new phrase, "de facto
friend of the court., 51 The novel unprecedented "de facto friend of
the court" was described as follows:
Importantly, the guardian ad litem should not be
confused with the de facto friend of the court.
Whereas the friend of the court investigates, reports,
and makes custodian recommendations on behalf of
the court, and is subject to cross-examination, the
guardian ad litem is a lawyer for the child, counseling
McKaig, 920 NW 2d 377, (Mich. Ct. Appeals 2018) (The child or an affected
parent cannot obtain relief for malpractice.).




49 Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 119 (Ky. 2014).
50 Morgan, 441 S.W.3d at 119.
51 [d
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the child and representing him or her in the course of
the proceedings.5 2
The upshot: The GAL attorney is really the client-directed child's
counsel, while the newly minted "de facto friend of the court"
appears indistinguishable from the traditional GAL.
Given the case law, is it possible to add even further
confusion to the important issue?5 3 The dual often conflicting roles
is illustrated in In re J 'K.M., where the GAL and the 16 year old
child had diametrically opposed positions. 4 The appellate court
resolved the dispute by holding that a second GAL should have been
appointed. The result: Two GAL's appointed to assume two
contradictory positions.
Finally, child protective cases are frequently appealed,
usually by the parent or, alternatively, the state. In many states, the
child also maintains standing to appeal. Suppose an attorney has
been appointed as GAL by the trial court. Since the attorney GAL is
not acting as a lawyer, at least in the usual sense, he has no
discernable role in the appeal. Ergo, GALs cannot appeal or,
alternatively, defend an appeal. Even bar membership cannot
convert the attorney GAL into legal counsel. In effect, the lawyer
who assumes a GAL status is disarmed, unable to present legal
arguments, engage in motion practice, or examine witnesses. Given
the limitations, in the Tennessee case of Toms v. Toms, the trial court
granted the attorney GAL's motion to appoint a separate attorney to
represent the attorney GAL; the decision was upheld by the appeals
court.5 6 The case represents just one additional manifestation of the
perils confronting the GAL, a peril which may be avoided only by
providing straight attorney representation.
For the remainder of this article, I shall assume that an
attorney represents the child, regardless of the role the specific
52 Morgan, 441 S.W.3d at 119.
5' The confusion is frequently compounded by state statutes which authorize an
attorney GAL to accomplish the impossible, represent both child's legal and best
interests: See e.g., 42 Pa C.S. § 63 11(a) (2019).
54 Inre J'K.M, 191 A.D. 3d 907 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018)
55 Id.
56 Toms v. Toms, 209 S.W. 3d 76, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
2019]
WIDENER COMMONWEALTH LAW REVIEW
attorney is mandated by state law to assume or, perhaps, elects to
pursue. Most children are represented by lawyers, as opposed to a
non-lawyer GAL, and the widespread scholarly and organized bar
practice guidelines endorse the legal representation model.57 The
question which has confounded the case law and legal literature is
whether the attorney should advocate and pursue the child's wishes
or, on the other hand, advocate and pursue the child's "best
interests."
The granddaddy statute, enacted by New York in 1962 and
still in effect in 2018, stipulates that children "often require the
assistance of counsel to help protect their interests and help them
express their wishes to the court., 58 The focus on the child's wishes
and "interests" represent traditional attorney responsibilities.
Significantly, the statute does not mention the child's "best
interests", a different concept than "interests": Every client in every
type of proceeding has "interests" to protect, as opposed to a
lawyer's unilateral determination of the client's "best interests". A
large body of case law supports the child's "wishes" model in child
protective cases. 59 But the case law is virtually silent in discussing
the child's legal interests.6 °
In any event, just how should counsel determine the child's
wishes and thereby tailor her advocacy? Attorneys formulate that
determination in every type of case and do so in collaboration with
the client. Perhaps two hypotheticals in other fields of law, one civil
and the other criminal, may prove helpful.
Assume that an attorney is retained to represent the plaintiff
in an automobile negligence case. The client understandably wants
" See, e.g., the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Administration for
Children and Families publication, subject" High Quality Legal Representation
for all parties in child welfare proceedings (2017), which states, at pp. 3-4 that
"while CAPTA allows for the appointment of an attorney and/or a court
appointed special advocate (CAS), there is widespread agreement in the field
that children require legal representation in child welfare proceedings."
58 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 241 (2019).
5 9 See, e.g., Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. Robert M., 788 A. 2d 888 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 2002), In re Adoption/Guardian No. 629 70003, 731 A. 3d 467 (Md.
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to recoup maximum damages and tells counsel "I want to recover
$150,000". Counsel's response may be to first explain the applicable
rules of law, including comparative negligence, proceed by
outlining the likely evidence, and then say: "Given the evidence, the
applicable rules, and my expertise, I believe that after pre-trial
motions followed by negotiations, your case is likely to settle for
between $50,000 and $80,000. If we demand $150,000, I fear the
defense attorney will not seriously negotiate. I therefore suggest we
request $100,000, which is a credible position, and we'll try to
negotiate a settlement reasonably close to that demand." In most
cases the client will agree to counsel's professional
recommendation, perhaps after further attorney-client discussions
(if he insists on his original position the attorney is obligated to
pursue his wish of adamantly demanding $150,000 or withdraw
from the case, but that scenario is relatively rare). In short, counsel
does not pursue his client's unrealistic wish, but, rather, achieves an
attorney-client consensus. The consensus, express or implied, may
encompass a range of legal interests, such as discovery, client
autonomy, and requests for interim relief.
Similarly, in virtually every criminal case the client's wish
is to be exonerated. That does not mean that defense counsel will
tell the court that the defendant wants dismissal and then adhere to
that position until the defendant is found guilty after trial and
sentenced to a lengthy period of incarceration. Instead, the attorney
may first attempt to secure a dismissal and, when that effort fails, as
it usually does, negotiate a plea to a reduced charge and sentence.
Of course, counsel does that with the client's consent, frequently
obtained following privileged discussions concerning the evidence
and the legal parameters.6 1 The negotiated disposition may not be
the "wish" of the defendant but instead the reality he accepts to
avoid a more punitive outcome.
Why the statutes, case law, and practice in the child
protective world focus almost exclusively on the raw unmediated
"wishes" of the child-client is puzzling. In other words, why is a
child protective case deemed to be different than any other form of
litigation? What would constitute unacceptable lawyering in other
proceedings has become the norm, at least in a significant majority
61 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009).
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of child protective cases. A better approach is needed, one which
will be discussed in Part 3 of this article.
The opposing child protective attorney paradigm to "child
wishes" is to advocate for the child's "best interests." However, the
"best interests" prescription is equally problematic. A glaring "best
interests" model deficiency is its inherent subjectivity. As noted
earlier, courts cannot even agree on a definition. At best, it is an
opinion by the attorney, who, unlike a forensic or other expert
witness, cannot be tested through the crucible of cross-examination.
Lawyers are good at determining legal interests - that is what they
are trained to do-but cannot readily determine "best interests" in the
abstract.
Further, "best interests" is the legal standard which the court
applies in determining a child protective disposition. Accordingly,
the standard shapes each advocate's argument and conclusions. The
petitioning social services agency attorney argues "best interests,"
ditto the parents' counsel, and so too the child's attorney. Each may
articulate a radically different position, but each attempts to
persuade the court that his position equates with "best interests."
Hence a child's attorney, whether she is guided solely by her
client's desires, or has developed a position collaboratively with the
child, will assert that her position is consistent with the youngster's
"best interests." In short, one does not need to be a "best interests"
lawyer to argue vehemently that his argument is consistent with
"best interests."
It is, thus, not surprising that the case law is inconsistent.
Neither "best interest" nor "child's wishes" suffice. Moreover,
neither polarized doctrines effectively or even marginally
incorporates the myriad legal interests of the child. The rather
primitive and conflicting formulas should be abandoned, replaced
by a more sophisticated legal interests centered paradigm-in short,
an approach which is far more mainstream in America
jurisprudence.
PART 3: A NEW PARADIGM
The first step in forgoing a typical attorney-client
relationship is ascertaining the client's interests, desires, and legal
rights. Counsel usually commences by analyzing legal documents.
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In a child protective case the pertinent papers include the petition or
complaint, supporting documentation, child protective service
reports, relevant prior cases or reports, and legal documents which
may have been filed by the respondent parent. Lawyers customarily
commence representation by reading relevant documents, thereby
gaining a preliminary sense of the dispute.
The initial client interview follows. The client will, in most
cases, inform counsel of facts which are not apparent in the written
material, answer specific factual questions, and articulate his goals
or desires-often merging facts, thoughts, and desires. A client's
goals may be realistic, unrealistic, or a combination of the
achievable and the unachievable. At that point, however, counsel
usually just listens patiently and asks questions in a non-
confrontational manner.
At the initial interview, the client almost always asks
questions relating to substantive and procedural laws. People need
counsel for knowledge and advice. They solicit guidance,
regardless of age, and are dependent on their chosen or assigned
representative. At that point there is no clear distinction between
legal interests and client wishes.
Instead, the attorney and the client are exchanging
information. The client's legal position is developed thereafter,
perhaps, at the same meeting or perhaps at a later meeting. That
position is based on a blended matrix of legal interests, substantive
law, and client goals, as developed through counsel's expertise and
attorney-client discussions.
The above primer is, unfortunately, needed only because the
paradigm is far from typical when representing children. Note that
there should be no formal barrier between legal interests and the
client's wishes. The needless conflict between "wishes" and "best
interests" does not exist. If, when representing children, we erase the
silly and largely unworkable word "best," concentrating instead on
"legal" interests, we can merge the two contradictory and endlessly
arguable principles of "best interests" versus "wishes." By the time
the case's merits have been reached, the child's wishes should have
been modified through counsel's realistic assessment and advice.
The process should mimic the process when a lawyer is representing
the youngster's adult peers. Simultaneously, the child should
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comprehend and agree to the legal interests his attorney will
advocate and protect.
Had the attorney acted alone without client involvement, as
do many children's lawyers, her advocacy may have been different,
but representation means just as the word suggests.62 An attorney
guides, advises, and often diplomatically debates a position with her
client, but never usurps the attorney-client relationship.
63
Exceptions to Conventional Representation
The child protective world includes children of every age,
from newborns to seventeen-year-old near adults. 64 When
representing the preverbal child, counsel has no choice but to
independently evaluate the case and advocate the client's perceived
interests, thereby deviating from traditional representation. For
some legal interests, the task may be relatively easy. If the child
needs specialized services, such as medical care, counsel's position
is clear. If the preverbal youngster has been abandoned or seriously
hurt, perhaps a viable kinship arrangement is possible. If the parent
needs rehabilitation services, it is surely in the child's interest to
insure implementation through advocacy. Other cases may
necessitate tough choices for the very young child, but that, under
the present system, cannot be avoided.
Of course, most represented children in child protective
cases are neither preverbal nor of limited cognitive ability. Further,
abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings frequently have
lengthy time spans. As the case continues through often lengthy
proceedings the child becomes increasingly mature. Hence the child
62 An incisive case which analysis is the role of the child's attorney and the
necessary engagement of the child is the Canadian decision of B.J.G. and D.L.G,
2010 YKSC 44 (2010).
63 Of course, other factors may interfere with the standard model of
representation. One is the speed of necessary judicial determinations,
particularly when the child has been subjected to a temporary removal from
home. A second is the large and sometimes overwhelming caseload of assigned
counsel; but the solution to a high caseload should be governmental financial
augmentation rather than client compromise.
6 Placement can also be extended until age 21 through foster placement or
guardianship.
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is increasingly capable of collaborating with counsel. And the
position should be articulated to the court in accord with the legal
standard, to wit "best interest." As cogently advanced a generation
ago by Jean Koh Peters:
[A]ny child advocate must become adept at
translating her proposals to the court into the
language of 'best interests.' Just as a tort attorney
must translate a client's story into the legal language
of fault and negligence, children's attorneys must
often translate their clients' desires and goals into the
framework of 'best interests.' Like any attorney who
respects the client's right to make her own informed
decision, the attorney may be in the odd position of
advocating a result which, personally, the lawyer
believes is not in the child's best interests. Thus, a
lawyer should be prepared to make an argument that
a client's desire is in her best interests as long as the
lawyer can do so in good faith. The lawyer should
press herself to make those arguments even when
they conflict with her personal assessment of the
client's 'best interests.'
65
One additional dilemma arises when the child insists on
maintaining a position that poses an imminent grave risk to her life
or health. Children usually want to remain home even when they
have been seriously abused or their parent is drug addicted. When
engaged in a collaborative lawyer-client relationship, counsel can
reason with the child-client, suggesting at least temporary
alternatives, such as kinship placement and rehabilitative services
for the parent. The attorney can also realistically advise the child
that the court is very unlikely to concur with his wish to remain at
home and further advise that placement is not permanent, but will
be reviewed, with the child's input, every six months.66
65 Jean Koh Peters, The Rules and Context of Best Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1505, 1515 (1996).
66 As required under the Federal "permanency" act.
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Experienced child lawyers agree that their clients may
initially request, but rarely persist in demanding, a resolution which
places them in imminent danger. After all, no one wants to be hurt.
In exceptional situations, the attorney may decline to advocate the
legally frivolous position, and instead advocate a position which
comes closest to the child's wishes without crossing the "imminent
danger" threshold.67 Further, most of the child's legal interests,
such as autonomy, the maintenance of family relationships, and
needed medical or social services, are not affected by the question
of placement. For those important interests, attorney-child client
conflicts are rare. The case law obsession with out of the home
placement versus non-placement is like the tail wagging the dog.
There is a lot more to a child protective case.
CONCLUSION
The representation of children in child protective cases has
expanded and evolved in the past half century. Today, most
children, almost all of whom are involuntarily involved, are
represented by attorneys or, more accurately, persons who possess
law degrees. The representation models include traditional client
representation, guardian ad litem representation, and a confusing
blend of traditional representation, guardian ad litem, and esoteric
unquantifiable roles such as "friend of the court."
Simultaneously, the statutory framework, case law, bar
association standards, and scholarship, have focused almost
exclusively on whether the child's representative, whatever the
appellation, should advocate the child's wishes or the child's best
interests. The case law development, truncated by the wishes and
best interests' debate, have largely ignored the multiple additional
legal interests of the child. Further, by obsessing over that sole
aspect, which is ironically absent in the majority of the cases where
the state does not seek to place the child outside her home, the
child's important rights are ignored.
This article proposes a new paradigm, one grounded largely
on a traditional client-attorney relationship. The time-honored rules
which define the role in counsel, from property to contract, to
67 Attorneys frequently ameliorate their client's extreme or frivolous requests.
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whatever the cause of action, is with little exception appropriate and
feasible when representing a youth. It is time to jettison the absurd
and paternalistic current paradigm, created in the past few decades,
and substitute a different paradigm-one which has been
successfully applied for centuries throughout the legal system.
